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Archive for September, 2026

To the Citizen Who Expects Better,

I have spent some time with the Constitution and have yet to discover the uterus among the enumerated powers of government.

This omission has apparently proved no obstacle.

American women now inhabit a curious definition of liberty. An adult woman may vote, own property, enter contracts, command troops, perform surgery, raise children, hold public office, run a corporation, and make decisions upon which the lives of others depend. Pregnancy, however, may cause the law to regard her judgment as suddenly insufficient. Decisions concerning what happens inside her own body may then be transferred to legislators who will never examine her, never read her chart, never stand beside her hospital bed, and never personally endure a single physical consequence of the command they have issued.

The indignity of that arrangement should trouble us. Its consequences should enrage us.

The argument over abortion has been conducted for decades as though it were primarily an argument about morality. Americans disagree profoundly about when developing human life acquires moral status and what obligations follow from pregnancy. Those disagreements are real, deeply held, and unlikely to disappear. A free society must make room for citizens to hold them.

Government power is a different question.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization ended the federal constitutional protection for abortion recognized under Roe and returned substantial authority over abortion policy to elected governments. The result is a country in which geography now determines dramatically different legal rights and medical options during pregnancy. As of September 2026, thirteen states enforce total abortion bans, while twenty-eight more prohibit abortion at some point in pregnancy.

We have now had enough time to discover that pregnancy does not conduct itself according to legislative schedules.

Pregnancies miscarry. Fetuses develop conditions incompatible with sustained life. Membranes rupture too early. Hemorrhage occurs. Infection develops. Ectopic pregnancies become emergencies. Physicians must sometimes make decisions quickly because the human body is notoriously indifferent to the wording of statutes.

The evidence emerging from states with severe restrictions deserves considerably more attention than another round of political slogans. Recent analysis of CDC data found that almost 200 women died following ectopic pregnancies between 2020 and 2025, compared with roughly 100 during the preceding six years; the increase was greater in states with abortion bans. That analysis does not establish that abortion bans caused every one of those deaths, and intellectual honesty requires saying so. It establishes something quite sufficient for public concern: women are dying in greater numbers from a condition modern medicine ordinarily knows how to treat, and the increase warrants serious investigation rather than political convenience.

Other evidence continues to accumulate. A 2026 peer-reviewed study found that implementation of Texas’s abortion restriction was associated with worsening self-reported maternal mental health compared with states without bans, although the authors appropriately caution that their observational study cannot establish every causal mechanism. Another peer-reviewed study found Texas’s 2021 restriction was associated with an unexpected increase in infant and neonatal deaths.

At some point, lawmakers who insist upon practicing medicine by statute must answer for what happens when their statutes meet actual medicine.

That sentence should make us uncomfortable.

It should.

The State has assumed an astonishing authority when it tells a competent adult that she must continue a pregnancy against her judgment. It assumes still more when the law constrains a physician deciding how sick she must become before intervention is legally safe. Such power cannot be made modest merely by calling it protection.

Nor is this question answered by assuring women that exceptions exist for their lives or health. An exception written comfortably into a statute is not the same thing as medical care delivered promptly in an emergency. Even current policy surveys caution that the existence of a legal exception does not ensure that a provider will be available or willing to perform the procedure.

We should dwell upon that distinction.

A legislator can write except to save the life of the mother and go home for dinner. The physician must decide what those words mean while the mother is bleeding.

How close to death must she come?

How much infection is enough?

How much blood must she lose?

How certain must the physician be that a prosecutor, licensing board, hospital attorney, or future jury will agree that the danger had become sufficiently grave?

These are grotesque questions to impose upon an emergency room, yet legislation can make such legal considerations part of the environment in which medical decisions occur.

The constitutional question extends beyond abortion. Americans should consider carefully the precedent inherent in granting government broad authority over intimate bodily decisions. A government powerful enough to compel one medical outcome because today’s majority believes that outcome morally necessary remains a government possessing that power when tomorrow’s majority arrives with different convictions.

Liberty has very little meaning if it protects only decisions with which the majority agrees.

I am equally unimpressed by the notion that opposition to these laws constitutes hostility toward pregnancy, motherhood, children, or families. A woman does not cease to possess constitutional dignity when she becomes pregnant. Her existing life does not become an asterisk beside another political objective. Her body is not public property merely because another potential life depends upon it.

Women are citizens.

That should have settled considerably more of this argument than it apparently has.

The State may regulate medicine. It may license physicians, establish standards of care, prosecute malpractice, protect patients, regulate pharmaceuticals, and enact laws within constitutional limits. None of that answers the deeper question of why pregnancy should grant government an extraordinary claim over the internal workings of one citizen’s body.

Those defending abortion restrictions offer an answer: they maintain that government is protecting prenatal human life and therefore has interests beyond the pregnant woman’s autonomy. That argument deserves to be stated fairly because millions of Americans sincerely believe it.

It does not end the inquiry.

Government frequently balances competing rights and interests. The existence of a legitimate governmental interest has never meant that every exercise of power undertaken in its name is therefore legitimate, proportionate, wise, or harmless. Constitutional government demands more than a noble purpose written at the top of a statute. We must examine what the law actually does to the people required to live beneath it.

That examination is becoming harder to avoid.

Women are traveling across state lines for care. Telehealth abortion provision into states with total bans increased from approximately 74,000 abortions in 2024 to 91,000 in 2025. The number of clinician-provided abortions nationally has not collapsed since Dobbs; Guttmacher estimates approximately 1.126 million occurred in 2025. Restriction has therefore produced, among other things, an elaborate interstate system in which medical access increasingly depends upon geography, travel, technology, money, and conflicting state laws.

One might reasonably ask what, precisely, we have accomplished.

We certainly have not eliminated abortion.

We have made circumstances matter more.

A woman with money can travel. A woman with reliable transportation can cross a state line. A woman with internet access and knowledge of shield-law providers may obtain medication remotely. The woman with none of those advantages encounters the full weight of the restriction.

There is something particularly offensive about calling such an arrangement equal liberty.

I am tired, moreover, of hearing women’s suffering discussed as an unfortunate complication of a grander political argument. The woman is not the complication. She is the citizen.

Her life counts before she is dying.

Her judgment counts before government agrees with it.

Her bodily autonomy does not become trivial because pregnancy makes its exercise morally difficult.

Her constitutional dignity does not depend upon whether strangers approve of the decision she makes.

Americans remain free to believe abortion is morally wrong. They may refuse one themselves, counsel against it, support alternatives, assist pregnant women, advocate for adoption, work to reduce unintended pregnancy, and persuade their fellow citizens. Persuasion is one of liberty’s great instruments.

Compulsion is another instrument altogether.

Any government that claims the power to compel pregnancy to continue must accept relentless scrutiny of the injuries produced by that power. Every delayed intervention matters. Every frightened physician matters. Every woman forced to travel hundreds of miles matters. Every poor woman who cannot make that journey matters. Every preventable medical catastrophe matters. Every death matters.

No political slogan absolves the State from answering for foreseeable consequences merely because the statute declared its intentions virtuous.

We have spent centuries arguing about the proper limits of government power. Perhaps women might finally be permitted the radical privilege of being included in that concern.

A woman’s body is not a committee room. Her pregnancy is not a legislative abstraction. Her medical emergency is not an opportunity for politicians to demonstrate ideological consistency.

She is not territory upon which the State may plant its flag.

She is a citizen of the Republic.

The distinction ought to be beyond debate.

I remain, in expectation,
Prudence C. Wilder

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To the Citizen Who Expects Better,

A republic asks something difficult of its citizens. It asks us to govern ourselves.

That requires disagreement. It requires argument. It even requires tolerating a considerable quantity of political nonsense. Presidents have exaggerated their accomplishments, minimized their failures, attacked their opponents, polished inconvenient facts, and occasionally said things so absurd that history has been kind enough to preserve them for our amusement.

Political dishonesty is not new.

But there is a difference between a politician attempting to persuade the public and a president repeatedly attempting to replace reality with whatever version of events best serves him at the moment.

President Donald Trump has made false and unsupported claims a persistent feature of his public communication. Elections he dislikes become fraudulent. Unfavorable statistics become false. Judges who rule against him become corrupt or partisan. Journalists who contradict him become dishonest. Institutions that resist him become enemies. Failures become successes, criticism becomes conspiracy, and evidence itself becomes suspect whenever it proves inconvenient.

One falsehood does not endanger a republic.

A thousand repeated often enough may.

The Constitution contains no clause requiring the President to be truthful in every public utterance. Such a provision would be both impossible to enforce and rather optimistic about human nature. The greater safeguard was supposed to be structural: divided power, an independent judiciary, a free press, elections, congressional oversight, and citizens capable of judging those entrusted with authority.

Yet all of those safeguards depend upon something the Constitution never bothers to say aloud.

Facts must remain possible.

Congress cannot meaningfully oversee an administration if every unfavorable finding can simply be declared fabricated. Courts cannot retain public confidence if every adverse ruling is characterized as corruption. Elections cannot settle political disputes if defeat itself becomes proof of fraud. Journalism cannot inform the electorate when inconvenient reporting is dismissed not by contrary evidence, but by declaring the reporter an enemy.

Eventually the citizen faces an impossible burden.

Before deciding whether a policy is wise, she must first determine whether the policy has been described truthfully. Before judging an economic claim, she must find the underlying numbers. Before accepting an accusation, she must locate the evidence. Before understanding what her own government has done, she must independently investigate the person whose constitutional office gives him unparalleled power to tell her.

This is where presidential dishonesty becomes more than a question of character.

It becomes a problem of government.

The presidency carries an authority no private citizen possesses. Presidential words are examined by markets, foreign governments, military leaders, federal agencies, journalists, courts and millions of citizens. A statement made from that office does not cease to carry institutional weight merely because it appears on social media.

The office follows the man into the room.

And with greater authority ought to come greater responsibility.

Franklin understood something about information that remains remarkably modern. He was a printer before he was a statesman. He lived in an age of pamphlets, partisan newspapers, anonymous essays, political gossip and magnificent public quarrels. He certainly did not inhabit some golden age of perfectly objective journalism.

He nevertheless understood that self-government requires citizens who can reason from evidence rather than surrender judgment to faction.

That may be the greater danger before us now.

Repeated falsehood does not merely persuade people to believe things that are untrue. Eventually it teaches them that truth itself is partisan.

Once that happens, correction becomes nearly impossible. Evidence contrary to one’s preferred leader becomes evidence of conspiracy. The court cannot be trusted. The newspaper cannot be trusted. The scientist cannot be trusted. The election official cannot be trusted. The civil servant cannot be trusted.

Only the leader remains trustworthy.

That arrangement has a name, but it is not republican government.

The remedy is not censorship. Nor should government establish some official ministry charged with deciding truth for the citizenry; such a cure would be more dangerous than the disease.

The remedy is the harder work of citizenship.

Demand evidence. Read beyond the headline. Consult original documents when they are available. Distinguish accusation from proof. Support journalism that corrects its mistakes rather than conceals them. Apply the same standard of evidence to politicians we favor that we apply to politicians we despise.

And perhaps most importantly, stop treating political falsehood as harmless simply because it comes from our own side.

No party possesses a constitutional exemption from reality.

A free people must be willing to say to any president, Republican or Democrat, conservative or progressive:

You may ask for our vote.

You may ask for our confidence.

You may ask us to follow your policies.

But you may not demand that we surrender our judgment.

The Constitution gives extraordinary power to the presidency. It gives something greater to the citizen: the authority to decide whether those entrusted with that power deserve to keep it.

That authority is useless if we abandon the habit of distinguishing what we wish were true from what the evidence demonstrates to be true.

So perhaps the question before us is not merely whether a president lies.

Politicians have done that since politics acquired politicians.

The more consequential question is this:

What constitutional damage occurs when Americans must routinely fact-check their own president before they can determine what their government is actually doing?

A republic capable of asking that question has not yet lost its bearings.

A republic that stops asking it may have.

I remain, in expectation,

Prudence C. Wilder

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To the Citizen Who Expects Better,

I have noticed a peculiar American talent of late. We are remarkably skilled at detecting dishonesty in politicians we dislike and remarkably charitable when the same disease afflicts our own. Apparently falsehood, like beauty, now resides largely in the eye of the beholder. This might be merely amusing if we were arguing over baseball, but the consequences become considerably less entertaining when we are choosing the people entrusted with the powers of government.

Donald Trump provides us with an unusually useful study of the problem because his social-media habits leave so little to the imagination. A favorable event becomes proof of his success, while an unfavorable one is attributed to someone else’s failure. A complimentary report is credible; an unflattering one is suspect. Institutions, officials, journalists and judges may be praised when they confirm his account of events and attacked when they contradict it. After sufficient repetition, one begins to wonder whether reality itself has been expected to declare a party affiliation.

Yet, I am less interested in why Mr. Trump writes these things than in what happens when the rest of us read them. For that, psychology offers a useful little discomfort called cognitive dissonance. The term sounds considerably more exotic than the experience, which most of us have probably encountered before breakfast. It describes the discomfort we feel when two things we believe cannot easily live together, particularly when one threatens our judgment, identity, loyalty or understanding of ourselves.

Suppose I have supported a politician for years. I voted for him, defended him, repeated his arguments and perhaps endured more than one dreadful family dinner on his behalf. Then I encounter credible evidence that he has behaved in a way I would ordinarily condemn. I now have two uncomfortable facts occupying the same chair: I believe myself to be a sensible person who exercises good judgment, yet the person upon whom I exercised that judgment may not deserve my confidence.

I could reconsider my opinion, of course, but reconsideration is unpleasant business. I might have to admit that I was mistaken, perhaps publicly and possibly to someone who remembers with irritating precision how confidently I once informed her that she was wrong. The human mind, being wonderfully inventive when protecting its pride, therefore offers alternatives. The newspaper may be biased, the judge corrupt, the statistics manipulated, the recording taken out of context, the offending remark merely a joke, or the conduct excusable because everyone does it and the other fellow is worse. The uncomfortable evidence has been disposed of while the original belief remains safely on the shelf.

This does not make a person stupid. It makes a person human, and that distinction is important. Cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias and motivated reasoning do not belong exclusively to Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, progressives or whatever political tribe has lately invented a flattering name for itself. They belong to the species. The sensible citizen therefore does not merely ask how those people can believe something so obviously questionable. She asks the considerably less comfortable question of what she herself might be willing to believe—or excuse—because she very much wants it to be true.

Here we arrive at the more serious matter. When a political leader repeatedly teaches supporters that unfavorable information comes from dishonest journalists, corrupt officials, partisan judges, fraudulent elections, crooked opponents or compromised institutions, the effect can extend far beyond belief in any particular falsehood. The citizen’s very method of deciding what is true may begin to change.

The process is not difficult to understand. A leader makes a claim and credible evidence contradicts it. Rather than answer the evidence, the leader attacks its source. The supporter is then presented with a choice: reconsider the leader or distrust the source. Distrusting the source resolves the discomfort without requiring any reconsideration of the original loyalty, and the next time that source presents contradictory information, it begins with less credibility than before. Repeat the process often enough and contradiction itself may eventually be interpreted as evidence of persecution. A newspaper’s correction becomes proof that the newspaper is hostile; an adverse judicial ruling becomes proof that the court is corrupt; an unfavorable election result becomes proof that the election was fraudulent.

This is a remarkably convenient arrangement for anyone possessing power, because the ordinary means by which error and misconduct are exposed have been converted into further evidence that the powerful person was right all along. It is also poison to self-government.

Our constitutional system assumes that powerful people will occasionally behave badly. The framers were under no illusion that election to public office performed some miraculous improvement upon human character. They divided authority precisely because ambition, vanity, faction and self-interest were expected to arrive at government each morning along with everyone else. The structure they designed therefore depends not upon perfect leaders, but upon competing institutions, independent sources of authority and a citizenry capable of judging among them.

Those restraints become fragile when political loyalty determines which evidence citizens are willing to consider. A court can check a president only while citizens remain willing to accept that courts sometimes rule against presidents for legitimate reasons. A free press can expose misconduct only while inconvenient reporting is examined rather than automatically treated as treachery. Elections can settle political contests only while losing an election is still permitted to mean that one lost. Accountability itself becomes little more than decoration when every accusation against our preferred leader may be dismissed before we have troubled ourselves to discover whether it is true.

No constitutional amendment can rescue us from that habit, because the final remedy is irritatingly personal. We must learn to become suspicious of our own certainty. When someone we support is accused of wrongdoing, we ought to ask the same questions we would ask if the accusation concerned someone we despised: What is the evidence? Where did it originate? Can it be independently confirmed? Am I rejecting the claim because it is poorly supported, or because accepting it would make me uncomfortable? Most revealing of all, would I excuse precisely the same conduct if the politician belonged to the other party?

There is one question I would place above all the others: What evidence would cause me to change my mind? Every citizen ought to be capable of answering it. If the honest answer is nothing, then evidence no longer governs the belief; loyalty does. At that point we have ceased evaluating a public servant and begun protecting an allegiance.

That is a dangerous bargain in any republic because democratic citizenship requires something more difficult than possessing opinions. It requires retaining ownership of them. No politician is entitled to that ownership—not Donald Trump, not his opponents, not your party and not mine. Public officials may ask for our votes, our support and occasionally our patience, but none may reasonably demand that we distrust our own eyes whenever they observe something inconvenient.

There is no shame in discovering that we were wrong. Indeed, the ability to discover it may be among the quiet virtues upon which self-government depends. The greater embarrassment would be arranging the whole of reality so that we never have to.

I remain, in expectation,

Prudence C. Wilder

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